The aim of this paper is to disentangle the different forces shaping Argentine immigration policy from 1870 to 1930. Although immigration restrictions increased over time Argentina remained relatively open to mass migration until the 1930s in contrast with the United States. The quantitative evidence presented here suggests that there were economic reasons to restrict immigration prior to the 1930s, namely rising inequality and a declining demand for workers. Labour in Argentina would have been better off with a more restrictive immigration policy since 1900. However, labour interests could not be translated into Parliament in a direct way as in countries with a wide electoral franchise and high political participation like the United States. In Argentina a large share of workers did not have the right to vote simply because they were foreigners. Those negatively affected by massive immigration developed alternative actions: general strikes, labour unrest and violence. Political and social fear finally pushed those who had more to gain from an abundant supply of labour to introduce immigration restrictions. The quantitative evidence presented here suggests that there were economic reasons to restrict immigration prior to the 1930s, namely rising inequality and a declining demand for workers. Labour in Argentina would have been better off with a more restrictive immigration policy since 1900. However, labour interests could not be translated into Parliament in a direct way as in countries with a wide electoral franchise and high political participation like the United States. In Argentina a large share of workers did not have the right to vote simply because they were foreigners. Those negatively affected by massive immigration developed alternative actions: general strikes, labour unrest and violence. Political and social fear finally pushed those who had more to gain from an abundant supply of labour to introduce immigration restrictions.
Immigration policy during the age of mass migration evolved from a more or less general open door policy around the 1860s to a final closing down during First World War and the 1920s, with rising barriers to international migration since the late nineteenth century.
Market forces were important in this policy shift as labour became more abundant in the New World, real wage growth slowed down, and income distribution differences widened. Political variables played also a role in shaping national immigration policies as a result of nation building, interest groups and more or less representative politics. This paper focus on Argentina since it is a relevant case study among New World countries before 1930. Argentina was only second to the United States in number of immigrants and in no other country had immigration such an impact compared to the size of native population. The ability of Argentina to attract large numbers of immigrants relative to their own population is striking not only in the Latin American context but also compared to Australia or Canada. 1 The conventional representation found in Argentine history is that, in spite of a growing concern about immigration, policy did not change substantially from the The quantitative evidence presented here suggests that Argentina had several economic reasons to restrict immigration prior to the 1930s, particularly rising inequality and a declining demand for labour as population and the economy grew. However, economic forces pushing for restriction were not successful in closing the door during the 1920s and immigration policy never turned to measures similar to those approved in the United States.
In a completely different institutional background Argentinean policy makers were dominated by pro-immigration interest. Unskilled labour force was composed overwhelmingly by foreign workers who could not participate in politics; they formed a de facto powerful political power with unskilled native workers (which in turn had very low electoral participation rates) and developed a very radical labour movement. Therefore, those hurt most by massive immigration could not change policy in parliament. However, their voice was heard loudly through massive strikes and labour unrest. It was the fear of political and social turmoil the ultimate reason for which those who controlled parliament and had more to gain with an abundant supply of labour eventually introduced immigration restrictions.
Open or closed? Two views on Argentinean immigration policy
Argentina is traditionally represented in the literature as a country open to mass immigration up to the 1930s. Argentina competed with Brazil (and to a certain extent with the United States) for immigrants from the same Southern European pool and, contrary to Canada or Australia, immigration policy was not restrictive. The standard view is that despite an increase in some regulation of arrivals during the 20 th century, Argentina had a de facto open door policy which pulled masses of immigrants.
Scholars agree that there was an increase in regulations on the conditions of entry, but legislation remained basically untouched since the 1870s. Classic assessments on economic growth in Argentina before the Great War stressed the role of liberal policies towards trade and migration and the openness of Argentina to capital and labour during the Belle Époque (Díaz Alejandro 1970) . Historians emphasize the fact that liberal policy remained almost unchanged despite many attempts to restrict the immigration flow and all the official rhetoric on the need to select high quality immigrants (Devoto 2001; 2003b) . Taylor (1992; elaborated on the reasons of Argentina's relative economic decline compared to Australia: different migratory policies (selective in Australia versus non-selective in Argentina) attracted different types of immigrants and had long run economic and demographic consequences. 2 Others claimed that immigration policy in Argentina was irrational and short-sighted because of the absence of restrictions (Solberg 1970) . The persistence of an open immigration policy in Southern Cone countries is commonly explained as a result of the political power in hands of the latifundistas and urban capitalists, while in the United States complaints from the median voter (the unskilled or semiskilled worker in an urban occupation) finally resulted in a restrictions to immigration (Hatton and Williamson 2007: 220-30) .
In Argentina the need to increase population to exploit the abundant natural resources was a strong element in the national building process. The 1853 Constitution established a long lasting legal framework entirely friendly to European immigration. 3 According to the Constitution and the following legislation (the 1876 Law of Immigration and Colonization)
foreigners enjoyed basic civil rights as freedom of association, movement, private property, profession and religion, among others. Immigrants were exempted from compulsory military service and they could vote in municipal elections. Naturalization was easy and with low requirements (Castro 1991).
At the turn of the twentieth century ideas about the positive influence of immigrants had changed. Foreigners arrived in huge numbers; they crowded in the cities and some of them became a threat to social order when they turned to be very influential in the radical labour movement. Since immigrants kept their nationalities of origin, a strong nationalistic 2 Taylor urged further research on the dramatic implications for long run economic growth of the open door immigration policy followed by Argentina. 3 Population was needed not only to people the Pampa and promote economic growth, but immigration had also the original goal of bringing culturally "superior" immigrants to "civilize" the country. Argentina never instituted discriminatory policies against particular foreign group (as the United States did with the Chinese) but always show a positive preference for European immigrants (Cook Martin and Fitzgerald 2010) . Europeans were considered in the early years of massive immigration superior workers than native population (Solberg 1970 Diputados, 1909, vol. I, pp. 190-192; 1916 , vol. 2, pp. 1651 -1664 1918-19, vol. V, pp. 581-583; 1922 , vol. V, pp. 345-352, y 1923 . In every proposal to restrict immigration, particularly during the 1920s, deputies and senators invoked the United States example. 5 Contemporaries shared the same view; Cuban officials in 1930 consider legislation in Argentina as "an example of a nation that marches at the head of the people that favour the immigrant". Quoted in Cook Martin and Fitzgerald (2010).
immigrants had political voice), the two countries experience a very similar drift away from free immigration. (Devoto 2003) . The 6 Brazil started subsidizing immigration in the same years so it was not by chance that the Argentine government thought that they were unable to compete for European workers. In addition, the government tried to attract Northern Europeans to balance the predominance of Italian immigration (Sánchez-Alonso 2007) 7 It is true that the disappearance of subsidies was likely to directly affect the costs and benefits of migration as viewed by the prospective immigrant but it should be bear in mind that the new index intends to measure intentions of immigrant policy from the point of view of the Argentine government. 8 Brazil kept a long lasting program of subsidised immigration and over 70 % of immigrants arrived with paid passages (Leff 1997; Holloway 1980) . Australia had an assisted migration programme all over the period, more or less generous according to economic conditions at home: 50 percent of arrivals in the 1870s were assisted but only 10 percent in the crisis years of the 1890s disappearance of subsidies was simultaneously counterbalanced with a substantial increase in The 1923 decree gave immigration officials extraordinary faculties to decide who was admitted and, according to Devoto (2001) , they were slack in the application of the requisites for entry. Economic growth in the last years of the 1920s seems to be the explanation for this very flexible immigration control.
To sum up, the new index presents a very similar trend in the evolution of immigration policy in Argentina as the T&W index, but the overall picture is one of a much milder restrictions throughout. The disappearance of subsidies did not represent a major antiimmigration policy shift, but rather government financial constraints after the Baring crisis. There is a clear consensus in the literature regarding the divided interest between labour and capital: wage earners, particularly unskilled workers, lose with immigration as the labour force grows and wages decrease, while owners of land and capital (also owners of skills) gain from the more abundant labour supply. A significant negative impact of immigration on wages is found in the United States (Goldin 1994; Hatton and Williamson 1998) . If, however, labour demand augments enough to offset the immigration impact on labour supply, it might be the case that wages do not decrease (or in a very small proportion)
as a result of massive immigration. Europe and in Argentina, so in order to understand the reaction of native workers to immigrant labour we should think in relative terms. Competition in the labour market between natives and immigrants is, therefore, related to the "quality" of the immigrants both in absolute and in relative terms.
"Quality" of immigrants is usually proxied by wages and literacy rates. Literacy in countries of origin of immigrants and relative rates of literacy between origin and destination allow testing the evolution over time of immigrant's quality. For the United States, it has been argued that the switch of emigrant sources from high-wage to low-wage European countries correlates with a decrease in the quality of immigrants; the Dillingham Commission reached that conclusion before 1914. Change in immigrants' origins was related to a drop in quality 12 This seems to be the case in Australia where wages actually increased with immigration (Pope and Withers 1994) and, consequently, to an increase in the demand for restrictions. In the case of Argentina there is no dramatic change in source countries over time ( The extraordinary growth in literacy rates of resident population in spite of the massive inflow of immigrants seems to support the idea that Argentina opted for raising the levels of education of the immigrant's children instead of restricting the flow of low quality immigrants. Natives and second generations of immigrants became more literate than their foreign parents so immigrants relative quality decreased in the long run. The trend was also reinforced by the declining numbers of highly literate immigrants from Northern Europe over time ( Figure 3 ). At the turn of the century, the image of native workers was vindicated at the expense of the Europeans. During the next decade many intellectuals came to agree that Argentine immigrants were generally of low quality (Solberg 1970:152 (Goldin 1994) . The debate about the quality of immigrants was present in political and intellectual circles but it was never translated into selective policies.
Unemployment increases the demand to close the door.
Unemployment usually increased the demand to close the door to foreign workers in immigration countries. Qualitative evidence stresses the high rates of unemployment in Argentina during the 1890s crisis but restrictions on massive immigration did not follow, as it happened in Australia. When wages, and therefore savings, earned in local currency, lost their value in relation to gold-standard currencies, workers responded by booking passages home.
It could be argued that there was a "guestworker" effect in Argentina during the early 1890s since return migration reached very high levels in 1890-1895: net migration dropped to 8.2 percent compared to 38 percent during 1885-1890. 15 Immigrants did voluntarily what any policy of restriction would have done. The crisis showed that distress in the labour market could be more easily alleviated by going back home (or moving to another immigrant country as Brazil or Uruguay). The declining cost of the trip allowed this safety valve in times of 13 According to Devoto (2003a) there were several bills in Congress proposing to restrict the arrival of illiterate immigrants. All of them were rejected by the majority.
14 In this calculation, I have excluded children from overall illiteracy rates in the Argentine immigration statistics particularly in the years immediately before World War I when the proportion of families with children arriving to Argentina reached its peak. unemployment (Fogarty 1989) . Therefore, the legacy of the 1890 crisis for policy makers seem to be the perception that policy restrictions were unnecessary since the immigration flow were very sensitive to economic conditions and contracted in adverse economic scenarios.
After the 1890s crisis immigration policy was unambiguously designed to address the needs of the labour market: the focus was on seasonal workers and not on workers to settle in the land permanently. Labour demand was highly seasonal and dominated by the agrarian cycles. Arable agricultural land needed two types of workers: one willing to work seasonally and another one to work year round. Immigrants were crucial for the first case, particularly those who crossed the Atlantic annually, but local workers (with a high number of immigrants among them) were moving out and into the cities depending on demand of labour in Immigrants usually gather in specific areas and regions. In an attempt to link different interest groups to political outcomes Goldin (1994) considers not only capital and labour interests but also rural-urban divisions. In the United States the probability that a legislator would vote for immigration restrictions was negatively associated to the proportion of foreign-born in a given district and was also negatively related to the level of urbanization.
The rate of urbanization in Argentina grew very rapidly since the 1870s precisely because of If Goldin's conclusions for the United States were to be applied to Argentina, the fact that immigrants were overwhelmingly represented in the cities would led us to conclude that urban populations would have opposed restrictions to immigration. But simultaneously urban immigrants were seen to be at the root of social problems such as crime, alcoholism, prostitution and street violence among others. City growth and the concentration of immigrants in urban population can, therefore, be related to hostility toward foreigners and demand for restrictions on immigration.
Argentine immigrant communities did not split into inter-ethnic rivalries as North American immigrants did. Nor were ethnic features correlated to skilled levels; each community hosted a spectrum of occupations and skills (the majority of them unskilled) with the exception of the small group of "old immigrants" from Northern Europe who arrived in the 1870s (Adelman 1992). As mentioned before there was no great difference in the ethnic profile of immigrants in the 1880s and the 1920s. Generally speaking, immigrants were rather successful in Argentina urban labour markets. Traditional immigrant groups were overrepresented among industrial proprietors and commerce owners. In terms of property ownership, for example, Italians did far better in Argentina than in the United States (Klein 1983; Baily 1999) . 16 However, immigrant businessmen and professionals also met increasing intellectual criticism. Solberg (1970) describes how the high percentage of foreigners in commerce and business provoked the fear that they might totally exclude nationals from business. Immigrants' economic success seems to be related to the fact that immigrants were seen more and more as competitors in the skilled and semi-skilled labour market. 16 Spaniards in turn were more successful than native workers in Buenos Aires in securing skilled occupations and entering into commerce (Moya 1988) .
Concentration of landownership and political power resulted in policies open

Inequality matters.
The distributional impact of international immigration has been confirmed for the age of mass migration since inequality increased in receiving countries (Williamson 1997).
Timmer To sum up, reasons to restrict immigration in Argentina can be grouped in (1) quantity and quality of immigrants. The extraordinary high percentage of foreigners over total population, the massive concentration of foreign population in very few areas and cities, and the rapid growth of the immigration rates particularly before 1914 seem to be powerful forces 17 Voters could however give priority to growth over distribution and considered the rising inequality as not harmful for future economic growth.
to close the door if immigrants were perceived as a threat to native workers. Simultaneously, there were other forces that seem to push in the opposite direction:
large numbers of workers were needed during the harvest season and there was a constant fear of a labour shortage in agriculture and in the export sector. Political institutions were dominated by those who had most to gain with an abundant supply of labour, (i.e. landowners and urban capitalist) and there was a constitutional provision to foster immigration; therefore immigration restrictions were difficult to approve. The next section will elaborate on some political economy variables that might also explain immigration policy.
A political economy explanation of Argentine immigration policy
In relative terms, Argentina remained a country more open to immigrants than others in the New World, except Brazil. In their pioneer research Timmer and Williamson (1998) concluded that in the case of Argentina "what remains a puzzle are the offsetting variables (the residual) that kept immigration policy from becoming even more restrictive". According to Solberg (1970:179) , immigration policy in Argentina was irrational and short-sighted since it was dominated by the interests of big landowners. Political participation increased notably European anarchists who seem to have been more worried about the working conditions, hours of work and political activities such as the "social revolution" than about the massive inflow of European workers. Unions always asked for higher wages but they never related the wage level to massive immigration. During World War I the suspension of immigration increased unions' bargain power. Generally speaking, however, labour organizations were unable to formulate a practical response to the disruptive effects of labour surplus. Unions never acted as a pressure group pushing the government to close the door to foreign workers.
The strong presence of European workers in the Argentinean unions could explain such an otherwise irrational behaviour. On the contrary, industrial and rural owners' federations had the expected pro-immigration policy with a strong emphasis on an abundant supply of labour while excluding radical (socialists and anarchists) immigrants (Ospital 1994) .
Political science will identify Argentine as a producer dominant model that involves relatively small and easily organized groups supporting policies that provide them direct benefits. Immigration generated concentrated benefits and diffused cost (Freeman 2006 Women had no voting rights throughout the period considered so the percentage of population entitled to vote must be adjusted to the total number of native males over the legal age. Population data come from censuses. The number of those eligible to vote is obviously different from what fraction of the population actually voted. 22 The percentage of native-born men with voting rights was lower in some districts as Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Córdoba since women (natives and foreigners) and men below 18 have to be excluded (Cortés Conde and Gallo 1996) . 23 Why immigrants in Argentina did not become citizens is beyond the scope of this paper (Moya 1998:489) concludes that low naturalization rates are attributable to the lack of incentives for naturalizing. Foreigners had all the rights of citizens (except to vote in national elections), but were exempted from the most cumbersome civic obligation: military service. Others have suggested that from a migrants' standpoint, there were strong incentives not to naturalize to the extent that naturalization implied loss of original nationality (Devoto 2003 political power by political institutions, may nonetheless possess it. They can revolt or use economically costly (sometimes peaceful) protests in order to impose their wishes on society.
An increasingly radical labour movement developed in Argentina and acted as a de facto political power. It was the channel used to express discomfort since workers could not otherwise influence policy. According to Baily (1999: 201) given the restricted nature of the Argentine political system, it is not surprising that the direct action of the anarchists and revolutionary trade unions held greater appeal to the immigrants than the call to naturalize and change the system by participation in essentially meaningless elections. The ruling class identified strikes (sometimes violent) and labour agitation as a direct consequence of the indiscriminate admission of foreign troublemakers and eventually restricted immigration. Anti-immigration legislation came from capital and landowners. Immigration policy became gradually more restrictive before World War I because workers acted as a de facto political power. After the War, immigration restrictions were step up in a more complex scenario: native labour and unions gained political representation, unskilled workers were better off since immigration rates decreased in the 1920s, and "new immigrants" of inferior quality although few in number, arrived. The government, unable to change the old 1876
Immigration Law, approved an administrative decree increasing the regulations of entry. In the mean time, the United States closed the door in 1921 and 1924. 25 The next section will try to disentangle the different forces shaping Argentina immigration policy.
The determinants of Argentine immigration policy: a quantitative exploration
The next step is to test empirically the relationship between immigration policy and economic and political variables. Table 2 Table 2 are presented in appendix C.
United States since few immigrants naturalized, but there were many more immigrants descendants that might be as well opposed to restrictions even if their jobs and wages were threatened by unrestricted immigration.
It is true that too many immigrants can raise hostile reactions particularly if their ethnic composition is different from native population and from old immigrant's cohorts. In the case of the United States, the switch of emigrant source countries from higher-wage to lower-wage areas in Europe raised a major concern about quality of immigrants. The story is different in Argentina since there is not such an ethnicity gap (Figure 2 ). National origins of immigrants were overwhelmingly dominated by Latin immigrants from the beginning; higherwage Northern Europeans decreased and "new immigrants" from lower-wage areas increased over time but both groups were a minority in a flow dominated by Italian and Spanish immigrants. New immigrants were too recent and too few to influence policy. An additional explanation might be the constant fear of labour scarcity among the ruling class: even when the percentage of foreigners reached very high numbers the agrarian and export interests seem to have been a powerful force against more restrictive measures of the inflow of foreign workers.
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Appendix A Argentine legislation on immigration and values for the new index of immigration policy
The index of Argentine immigration policy intends to measure policies that are likely to directly affect the costs or benefits of migrating to Argentina as viewed by the prospective immigrant. It is not always possible to calibrate some pieces of legislation (the 1902 Residence Law might be the case in point) that seem to respond more to the intentions of immigration policy as viewed by the government.
Policy is coded from value 0 (closed immigration policy) to 10, the latest being a totally open immigration policy with the usual restrictions. The 1876 Law of Immigration and Colonization included in the category of "inadmissible": individuals afflicted with contagious illnesses (or from ports where there had been an outbreak of cholera, yellow fever or other communicable disease), the insane, convicted felons, and the elderly (unless they were heads of household) (Articles 31 and 32). The last three categorical exclusions were common place in immigration policies. During the period under review illness was not often used to exclude immigrants possibly because the LIC held shipping concerns financially responsible for the repatriation of diseased individuals.
From 1870 to 1930 temporary lodging on arrival, free transport inland from Buenos Aires and easy naturalization remained in place.
According to the 1876 Law, every immigrant who satisfactorily proves his good conduct and his skill in any trade or industry has the right on entering the Republic to the following advantages: (1) To receive board and lodging at the expense of the State from 5 to 22 days according to the circumstances, such as the immigrant's state of health; (2) To be placed in employment in the trade or industry of his choice if it exists in the country; (3) To be transported at the expense of the State to the part of the Republic in which he desires to settle; (4) To bring with him, free of all duty, furniture, clothing, instruments and tools which are necessary for the work he is going to undertake, up to the value indicated by the Executive Power. These provisions are extended, wherever they are applicable, to the wives and children of immigrants. Special and more generous regulations were in force for immigrants who were going to agricultural settlements.
The lowest values of the index (closed or only slightly ajar doors enforced) were never reached before 1930. Restrictive quotas and/or literacy test were never introduced in Argentina during the period considered. A December 1930 decree imposed a consular fee of 10 pesos gold for stamping required health, good conduct and financial solvency certificates but in 1931 another decree exempted would-be settlers from the payment of consular fees. Finally, in 1932 the government suspended all visa authorizations at the point of departure for people who did not have a work contract in hand and/or support from an authorized and financially solvent family member.
Index Values
Norms, legislation and regulations.
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1853 Constitution: Preamble invites all good-willed citizens of the world to immigrate to Argentina. Article 25 establishes that the federal government will foment European immigration. Easy or low requirements for naturalization. Legal property ownership for foreigners. Appendix C: Econometric Tests (Table 2) I have analysed the order of integration of the variables used, with the Augmented DickeyFuller test. All variables are integrated of order one, I (1), that is, its first difference does not contain a unit root. We reject the hypothesis of a unitary root at the 1 per cent confidence level. The results of the tests carried out are the following: 
